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This article puts forward an interpretation of development
as a process of accumulation of technological and social
capabilities dependent upon taking advantage of successive
and different windows of opportunity. These windows are
determined from the core countries, through the
technological revolutions which occur every half-century
and the four phases of their deployment. The possibilities
of progressing at each opportunity depend on the
achievements made in the previous phase, on identifying
the nature of the next one, understanding the techno-
economic paradigm of the revolution in question, and being
able to design and negotiate, in each case, a positive-sum
strategy, taking account of the interests of the most powerful
firms. On the basis of this interpretation, a summary review
is made of the successive development strategies applied
since the 1950s. The author then outlines the likely nature
of the next phase and, applying the principles of the current
techno-economic paradigm, explores some aspects of the
institutional changes to be carried out.
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I
Technological change and development
Technology is usually seen as a specialized field of
development policy, with separate institutions. In this
study, however, we maintain that, rather than being
merely an element of development strategies,
technology is a condition for their viability. The
opportunities for development are a moving target. Any
serious observer of the progress made in terms of
development from the late 1950s to the late 1970s must
acknowledge that the import substitution strategies
applied by various countries resulted in gradual but
significant advances. In the mid-1970s, when the
combination of the industrial redeployment from the
North with export promotion from the South showed
and promised new and broader advances, there was
hope that progress would be constant. With the failure
and subsequent deterioration of the model based on
protection and subsidies in most of the countries which
tried to keep on applying it, the pendulum has swung
to the other extreme, so that all the achievements
previously made with that model are now denied. This
has provided fertile ground for advocating the free
market as the only way of achieving satisfactory results
in terms of development, even though the efficacy of
that policy has not yet been proven.
This article maintains that development
opportunities arise and undergo changes as the
successive technological revolutions are deployed in
the advanced countries. Technology and production
equipment are only transferred voluntarily when they
hold out the promise of mutual benefits. The import
substitution strategies were successful because they
represented a positive-sum game for the mature
industries of the developed world, which were coming
up against technological exhaustion and market
saturation. With the eruption of the information
revolution, however, these conditions radically changed
and other viable options opened up.
Based on this interpretation, this article examines
development strategies from a different angle, which
can be especially useful as regards the challenges of
the globalization process and the information era.
Firstly, it analyses the evolution of technologies, in
order to understand in what conditions development
opportunities are created and to determine their
nature. It then goes on to address the question of
development as a way of learning to take advantage
of these changing opportunities. This is illustrated
through a review of the successive development
models applied in the last  50 years and an
examination of the challenges raised by the next stage
of concentration of power in the world economy.
Finally, some of the institutional requirements for
coping with the new “flexible networks paradigm”
are studied.
II
The product cycle, development and
changes in barriers to entry
The role played by imported technology as a mandatory
stage on the road to industrialization is a fact that is
known historically from the experience of the United
States and various European countries in the nineteenth
century and the early twentieth. More recently, this role
has been confirmed by the rapid transformation of Japan
into a first-line country and the big advances made by
the four “Asian tigers”. The success of these countries
has undoubtedly been due to the absorption of
technology from the most advanced countries and their
own efforts to adopt, adapt, modify and master the
This study was originally prepared for UNCTAD X and was
subsequently presented at the seminar on development theory at
the dawn of the twenty-first century, organized by ECLAC in
Santiago, Chile, to commemorate the centenary of the birth of Raúl
Prebisch.
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corresponding technical know-how (Freeman, 1987;
Amsden, 1989). However, many more examples can
be cited of countries which had little success in
promoting their development over the same period, even
though they apparently applied similar procedures for
making use of imported technology. Furthermore, many
countries and even whole regions –such as Africa and
most of South America– seem to have lost much of the
ground previously won (Mytelka, 1989; Katz (ed.),
1996).
The reasons for such different results are to be
sought partly in the specific policies applied in each
case and partly in the particular conditions of each
country. At a deeper level, these reasons are connected
with the nature of the windows of opportunity created
by the technological evolution of the leading countries
and the capacity for consciously or intuitively taking
advantage of them. This makes it necessary to consult
the abundant specialized literature on the ways in which
technologies evolve and diffuse.
1. The product life cycle and the geographic
propagation of technologies
One of the first attempts to analyse the technological
possibilities of the developing countries was made by
Hirsch (1965). By examining the behaviour of the
traditional electronics industry in terms of the product
cycle, Hirsch showed how the advantages shift in favour
of the less advanced countries when technologies
approach maturity. Wells (1972) graphically
summarized the process for the case of the United
States, in his study of the literature on the product cycle
(figure 1).
The migration of production, first from the country
of origin to other advanced countries and later to less
developed countries, revealed one of the processes
behind the paradox observed by Leontief, whereby the
exports of the United States had a higher labour content
than its imports (Leontief, 1954). This situation, which
was unexpected for the leading country in matters of
technology, is related with the changing characteristics
of evolving technologies. Technologies tend to make
more intensive use of labour in their initial phases and
to use relatively costly personnel with high levels of
knowledge and qualifications.1 When they approach
maturity, however, they are using highly standardized,
mechanized and automated processes.
When technologies mature, there are forces which
push them out more and more towards the periphery,
where, presumably, there are complementary forces that
pull them in order to set development processes in
FIGURE 1
The geographic outspreading of technologies as they mature
A schematic presentation of the U.S. trade
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Source: Wells (1972), p. 15.
1
 See Hirsch (1965 and 1967), Vernon (1966) and, more recently,
Von Tunzelmann and Anderson (1999).
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motion. Although this observation applies above all to
consumer goods and some basic capital goods, the range
of products covered is wide enough to serve as a starting
point for the analysis.
2. With mature technologies there can be no
catching up2
It is ironic that advantages are shifting in favour of
capital-poor countries precisely when the production
process is marked by more intensive use of capital.
When this phase has been reached, tasks have become
so routine –see phase 4 in figure 2–3 that production
does not require much prior know-how or
experienced managers, while the processes can use
unskilled labour. As technology and markets reach
maturity, the determining advantage is the comparative
cost profile.
Can there be a catching-up process in development
based on mature technologies? This is extremely
unlikely, for various reasons. As shown in figure 3,
mature technologies reach a point where they have only
minimal potential for producing profits, face stagnant
markets, and have almost no room left for improving
productivity. Thus, generally speaking, using the











Changing entry requirements as technologies evolve to maturity
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FIGURE 3
Changing potential of technologies as they evolve to maturity
Space for productivity Potential for market Profit making Investment cost
improvement growth capacity (production facilities)
Hig
Low
Source: Based on Gerschenkron (1962), Cundiff and others (1973), Kotler (1980) and Dosi (1982).
2
 This section is based on Pérez and Soete (1988).
3
 It may be considered that phase 4 approximately covers phases
IV and V in Wells’s diagram (see figure 1).
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very profitable nor very promising. Even so, it is
probably the best starting point for creating a basic
industrialization platform, generating learning capacity,
and establishing the basic infrastructure and other
externalities needed to back up a development effort.
However, catching-up supposes a dynamic
development process, fuelled by local innovation and
growing markets. This requires an entry as early as
feasible. Surprisingly enough, apart from the mature
phase of technologies, the other moment when weaker
players confront surmountable barriers is not in phases
two or three but rather in phase one. This happens to be
the most promising entry point, because, as indicated
in figure 3, potential profits are high, there is ample
space for market and productivity growth and
investment costs are relatively low. Even research and
development investment, can often be lower than that
of the original innovator.
It might be thought that only the enterprises of
advanced countries can possess the high level of
knowledge required in this phase (see figure 2).
However, if the new products belong to the early phases
of a technological revolution, the know-how involved
tends to be in the public domain (available in
universities, for example). An example of this is the
recent case of Silicon Valley and its thousands of
successful imitators all over the world. In these cases,
the prior experience required is not very great, and
indeed, possessing it may even be a disadvantage,
because technological revolutions impose new
management models which make the previous ones
obsolete.
The other restrictive factor is connected with the
surrounding environment. Success in using new
technologies depends on certain important
complementary factors, such as dynamic advantages
and different types of externalities, especially the
physical, social and technological infrastructure or the
existence of competent and demanding local clients.
These elements may have been built-up before with
mature technologies, or they can be acquired through
intensive learning processes and investments in the
improvement of the social and economic environment.
It would appear, then, that a strategy could be
designed for accumulating technological and social
capabilities through the use of mature technologies and
then making use of that base for gaining access to new
and dynamic technologies, but this possibility depends
to a large extent on the specific opportunities created
by the successive technological revolutions. A full
understanding of the way technology evolved in the
advanced countries could be useful for developing
countries wanting to design viable strategies. This is




The evolution of technology is a complex process;
technologies are interconnected in systems, and these,
in turn, are intertwined and interdependent, both with
each other and in relation to the physical, social and
institutional environment.
Much of technological learning is gradual and
incremental. However, there is no inevitable progression
towards an ever more advanced and always unattainable
frontier. There are important discontinuities which
become windows through which latecomers can leap
forward. These opportunities occur in the form of
technological revolutions and involve sharp changes
of direction in technological progress; they also provide
the means for modernizing most activities at the cost
of abandoning much of the management know-how
previously accumulated and part of the previous
equipment, along with the related specialized
knowledge. New technologies of a revolutionary nature
open up new opportunities for learning and catching-
up. The interaction of continuous and discontinuous
technological changes explains why and how windows
of opportunity for development vary with time.
1. Technological trajectories and the accumulation
of experience
In spite of their specific differences, most technologies
tend to follow a similar trajectory as regards the rate
and direction of change and improvement, from initial
innovation to maturity. This evolution more or less
C E P A L  R E V I E W  7 5  •  D E C E M B E R  2 0 0 1114
TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE AND OPPORTUNIT IES FOR DEVELOPMENT AS A MOVING TARGET  •  CARLOTA PÉREZ
coincides with that of their markets: from introduction
to saturation4 (figure 4).
After a radical innovation gives rise to the
appearance of a new product, capable of generating a
new industry, there is an initial period of intensive
innovation and optimization, until the product gains
acceptance in the corresponding market segment.
Interaction with the market soon determines the
direction that improvements will take, and these often
define a dominant design (Arthur, 1989; David, 1985).
From that point on, as the markets grow, successive
incremental innovations are made to improve the quality
of the product, the productivity of the processes, and
the producers’ market position. This process culminates
in maturity, when new investment in innovations begins
to have diminishing returns. Depending on the
importance of the product, the whole process can last a
few years or a number of decades. In the latter case,
the “improvements” usually take the form of successive
models.
After the first innovations, the firms developing
the technology acquire advantages, not only through
patents but also –and perhaps more importantly–
through the experience accumulated with product,
process and markets. This tends to keep the
corresponding general and specialized know-how in the
hands of the producers and their suppliers, making it
less and less accessible to new entrants. This experience
also speeds up the adoption of innovations, so that the
last ones are incorporated very rapidly and it is even
more difficult for latecomers to catch up with the leaders
(see figure 5, which illustrates this phenomenon, taking
the example of the successive innovations in
automobiles).
2. Technological systems and the creation of
social capabilities
Technologies are not developed in isolation, but are
connected with each other in systems, giving each other
mutual support and taking advantage of experience, the
development of suppliers, consumer education and
other externalities created by their predecessors in the
system (Freeman, Clark and Soete, 1982).
Technological systems evolve along similar lines
to those of individual products (figure 4). New products
represent incremental improvements in the system. In
the first two phases there are many really important
products with a long life cycle; afterwards, they tend
to go down in number and importance, until the last
ones are less significant and have a short life cycle (such
as disk brakes and radial tires in figure 5).
Figure 6 presents a stylized example of the
technological system of household electrical appliances,
beginning with refrigerators, washing machines and
vacuum cleaners and later expanding to a series of new
products and successive models of earlier products.
Both tend to reach maturity more or less simultaneously,
together with the introduction of the last minor
FIGURE 5
Shortening of cycles of late innovations: Spread of





 Abernathy and Utterback (1975), Dosi (1982) and Sahal (1985).
Among textbooks on business management, special mention may
be made of Cundiff and others (1973) and Kotler (1980). An
extensive summary is given in Coombs and others (1987) and Dosi
(1988). A full interpretation of the relations between technology,
the economy and policies is given in the classic work by Freeman
(1974) on the economics of innovation and in the updated version
by Freeman and Soete (1997).
Years




























The evolution of a technology: A technological
trajectory












Source: Based on Nelson and Winter (1977), Dosi (1982),
Freeman and Pérez (1988), Wolf (1912), Abernathy and Utterbak











115C E P A L  R E V I E W  7 5  •  D E C E M B E R  2 0 0 1
TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE AND OPPORTUNIT IES FOR DEVELOPMENT AS A MOVING TARGET  •  CARLOTA PÉREZ
innovations of the system, such as electric can openers
and carving knives. The figure also shows how the
systems become established in particular territories,
thanks to the extension of the network of suppliers of
parts and services and the gradual establishment of
regulatory frameworks and other institutional
facilitators.
This growing interaction of “hard” and “soft”
elements is one of the aspects that Abramovitz (1986)
was referring to when he criticized the concept of
development as the simple accumulation of capital and
labour, stressing the need to acquire social capabilities.
It is also related to the notion of national or regional
systems of innovation formed by the interacting agents
(Freeman, 1993; Lundvall, 1988 and 1992).
The need to form these complex networks of
mutually supportive activities and institutions explains
some of the limitations that development encounters
when it is based on the transfer of mature technologies.
It also gives support to the arguments of those who
recommend building upon the traditions, local capacity
and knowledge existing in each particular territory
(Porter, 1991). Finally, it also shows the type of action
needed to effectively support the survival of pioneering
firms in developing countries.
3. Technological revolutions and the
interconnection of systems5
Each technological revolution is a set of technology
systems which gradually create the necessary conditions
for the appearance of new systems, all following similar
principles and obtaining benefits from the same
externalities. Figures 7 and 8 illustrate two of these
explosions of new technologies: the mass production
revolution, with its successive systems, which
crystallized around 1910 and reached maturity in the
1960s and 1970s, and the information revolution, which
has been propagating since the 1970s.
The process of multiplication of innovations and
technological systems, both up and downstream from
the industries that form the core of each technological
revolution, explains the enormous growth potential
possessed by each of these constellations of new
technologies. This process represents the opening up
of a vast new territory for innovation, expansion and
growth. The initial innovations correspond to the
FIGURE 6
Co-evolution of a technological system and its environment: Household appliances

5
 Freeman and Pérez (1988). An extended analysis of each of these
revolutions, since the original Industrial Revolution in England,
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The mass production revolution: A growing network of
technological systems which spread out from 1910 on
Specialized equipment and technical services for:
Prospecting, production and transport. Plant design and construction
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The information revolution: A growing network of
technological systems which spread out from 1970 on
Specialized equipment, supply of parts, specialized services, new materials, satellites.
Fibre optics, specialized firmware and software, leading-edge science, etc.
SUCCESSIVE SYSTEMS UPSTREAM
SUCCESSIVE SYSTEMS DOWNSTREAM
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“discovery” of this territory, while the phase of maturity
and exhaustion corresponds to its total “occupation”.
Figures 4 and 5, with a longer time scale, may also
be interpreted as the life trajectory of a technological
revolution. In this case, the incremental
“improvements” would be the successive new
technology systems. As in the previous cases, in the
early period of growth many major systems make their
appearance, but as the process advances towards
maturity the new systems tend to be fewer and less
significant.
4. Techno-economic paradigms and the
rejuvenation of all activities
Existing mature industries neither remain unchanged
nor passively coexist with the new industries. Each
technological revolution brings generic and all-
pervasive technologies, together with new
organizational practices, which significantly increase
the potential productivity of most existing activities.
The principles on which this modernizing process is
based are gradually incorporated into a best-practice
model which we have called the “technological style”
or “techno-economic paradigm”.6 The result is the
gradual rejuvenation of the whole productive structure,
so that updated mature industries can again behave like
new industries in terms of dynamism, productivity and
profitability.
This process may explain the disappointment of
those who, in the North-South Dialogue of the 1970s,
cherished the hope of transferring mature industries to
the developing world on a permanent basis. Since the
1980s, one industry after another has been modernized:
even such a traditional activity as the clothing industry
has been rejuvenated and placed on an innovative
course, with segmented markets (Hoffman and Rush,
1988; Mytelka, 1991).
5. Change of paradigm as a change in
management common sense
A techno-economic paradigm articulates the technical
and organizational models to take the fullest advantage
of the potential of the corresponding technological
revolution. Each paradigm provides a new set of
“common sense” principles which serve to guide the
decision-making of entrepreneurs, innovators,
managers, administrators, engineers and investors
towards the greatest efficiency and efficacy in both old
and new activities. For those who had obtained
satisfactory results with the previous paradigm, the
process of adopting a new one may be devastating, for
as well as demanding the abandonment of a body of
experience acquired with great effort, it is as if the world
had been turned upside down (Peters, 1989; Coriat,
1991).
Figure 9 shows how, with the transition from the
mass production model to the flexible networks model,
management criteria are changed in all fields, from
product selection and design to organizational
structures, forms of operation, and personnel relations.
Such phenomena as globalization and the tendency
to political decentralization are also closely related with
the change of paradigm, with the new possibilities it
offers, and the most effective way of taking advantage
of them. It may be considered that the Schumpeterian
description of technological revolutions as processes
of “creative destruction” is applicable not only to the
economy but also to policies and institutions.7
The process of change is not easy, and the transition
to the new practices may take two or three decades.
Finally, however, the new paradigm becomes accepted
as general common sense and is considered the natural
and normal way of doing things.
Newcomers or those who had not been successful
with the previous paradigm can simply redirect their
efforts towards learning the new practices, whereas the
established leaders have to “unlearn” much of the old
paradigm and adopt the new one. Much of the
experience acquired and a considerable part of the
investments made in the previous context become
obsolete and have to be replaced. The renewal process
is long and difficult, so the newcomers may have a
certain advantage, which can be reinforced by early
investment in the new infrastructure and the creation
of suitable facilitating institutions.
6
 Pérez (1983 and 1986). The expression takes the notion of
technological paradigm proposed by Dosi (1982) to describe the
trajectories of individual technologies to construct a broader concept
which defines a common trajectory or “meta-paradigm”.
7
 The enterprises of the developing world have had to go through a
double transition, since they have also had to give up the
protectionist model (see Pérez, 1996).
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IV
Development as learning to take advantage of
changing opportunities
The picture thus drawn in broad lines shows
technological evolution as a process with periods of
continuity and discontinuity deriving from the nature
of competition in a capitalist system. At the
microeconomic level, each radical innovation represents
a discontinuity followed by continued evolution until
the reduction in the possibilities of increasing
productivity and profits gives rise to a search for other
radical innovations. At the macrosystemic level, the
successive technological revolutions irrupt in the
economic system, bringing whole constellations of new
products,  technologies and industries. These
fundamental discontinuities give rise to great surges of
growth, initially in the core group of industrialized
countries, where, in addition to the explosive expansion
of the new industries, they also encompass and
gradually rejuvenate most of the existing industries. At
FIGURE 9
Change of paradigm
MASS PRODUCTION MODEL FLEXIBLE NETWORKS MODEL
Petroleum and automobile era Information technology era
Intensive use of energy and raw materials Intensive use of information and knowledge
Inputs and value in products, processes, transport, etc. Saving of energy and raw materials
Tangible products Intangible services and value
Products and markets Standardized products Diversified and adaptable productsMass markets Highly segmented markets from the basic
mass product to small niches
Form of operation One best way Continuous improvementOptimum routine is the goal pursued Change is the main routine
Centralized organizations Decentralized networks
Hierarchical pyramids Strategic centreStructures Functional departments Semi-autonomous multifunctional units
Rigid channels of communication Interactive communications
(vertical and horizontal)
Human resources Human capital
Personnel Labour viewed as a cost Labour viewed as an asset
Training viewed as an expected externality Training viewed as an investment
A change in technological and management “common sense”
the end of the process, when the whole set of industries
is approaching maturity, the process spreads to the
periphery, while in the core countries the next great
surge is already irrupting.
The developing countries are thus pursuing a
moving target which not only advances all the time but
also changes direction approximately every half-
century. If autarky is dismissed as an option, then
development is a question of learning to play this game
of constant shifts and variations, which is also a power
game.
Could this be another version of dependency
theory? It undoubtedly involves a notion of North-South
and centre-periphery complementarity, yet at the same
time it offers the possibility of breaking the vicious
circle of underdevelopment by adopting suitable
policies. Those who understand the game and play it
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well could find a way of making a leap forward and
catching-up. The real lessons taught by the Asian Tigers
do not lie in replicable recipes but rather in
understanding the specific dynamics that made
development possible. For such an understanding we
need to know why the most favourable conditions for
advancing occur during the periods of paradigm shift.
1. Periods of change of paradigm as dual
technological opportunities
For a period of some 20 years or more, during the
transition from one paradigm to another, old
technologies co-exist with new ones. Most of the mature
technologies of the previous paradigm are being
outstretched in an attempt to overcome the limitations
on productivity and market growth by spreading out
geographically in order to survive. This takes place at
the same time that the new technologies are expanding,
flourishing and growing rapidly, with big profit
margins. This situation characterized the 1960s and
1970s in the developed countries, giving rise to
centrifugal trends in which the rich, modern and
successful become richer, while the poor and weak
become poorer. Paradoxically, however, it is in such
periods, when social and economic conditions are at
their worst, that the best opportunities appear.
During the transition between paradigms, the two
main windows of opportunity open simultaneously:
phase 1, that of the new technologies, and phase 4, that
of the mature technologies (figure 10).
Although mature products can serve to provide
growth for a certain length of time, they are not capable
of driving a process of catching up, because their
innovation potential is largely exhausted. During
paradigm transitions, however, there is an excellent
opportunity for making a leap forward. The new generic
technologies and organizational principles can be
applied in order to modernize and rejuvenate mature
technologies (and even traditional technologies), as
occurred, for example, in the automobile industry and
other sectors in Japan, the shipbuilding and steel
industries in South Korea, surgical instruments in
Pakistan (Nadvi, 1999), and exports of fresh flowers
from Colombia and fresh salmon from Chile.8 During
the transition, it is also possible to try to enter the new
industries directly, as many firms in developing
countries did in the case of microelectronic products
and software. The problem is then how to pass
successfully through phases 2 and 3. Many of the bright
early stars disappeared in this attempt. Staying in the
FIGURE 10































2 3 4 1’ 2’
8
 These and other examples are described in ECLAC (1990).
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race requires growing support from the economic
environment, constant innovation, capital-intensive
investments and, probably, great maneuverability as
regards markets and alliances. Memory chips in South
Korea, hard drives in Singapore, and the Asian computer
clones are examples of this type of success, although
in very specific conditions in each case.
In this specific paradigm transition, a very strong
third possibility appeared within the context of
globalization. In contrast with how the industries of
the mass production paradigm were deployed nationally
first, before moving internationally, many industries in
this paradigm have operated globally from phase one.
This has opened up the possibility of participating in
global networks in many roles and with varied
arrangements (Hobday, 1995; Radosevic, 1999). It has
also allowed producing locally for export through
global trading companies, either as single firms or by
organizing cooperating clusters.9
2. “Dancing with wolves”10 or the question of
power structures
In order to fully understand the conditions of access to
technology, it is necessary to consider the power
structures. The changing nature of barriers to entry is
closely related to the levels and forms of competition
and concentration in the industry in question. The nature
of each phase marks the behaviour of the firms involved
and gradually modifies their main focus of attention
and their interests.
Table 1 presents a stylized summary of the
changing patterns of competition and power structures,
which may typify evolving industries, their technologies
and markets. It also indicates the “size” of the window
of opportunity in each phase and the conditions that
must be fulfilled by aspiring entrants, be they dependent
(i.e., joining the strategy of owner firms) or acting
autonomously as direct challengers in the market.
This stylized scheme cannot represent all cases,
nor is it possible, in this brief article to examine all the
variations and subtleties involved. The table can serve,
however, as a frame of reference for making some
important observations:
i) Since there will always be products and industries
passing through the different phases, it is necessary
to be conscious and well-informed about the phase
of evolution of the specific technologies and about
the patterns of competition prevailing in the various
market segments, in order to be able to identify
the interests of possible allies or competitors and
assess their strengths. This process will also be
useful for estimating the value of the assets and
possibilities of one’s own firm, in order to improve
the decision-making process and the design of
negotiating strategies.
ii) It is also important to identify the current phase of
deployment of the technological revolution. Since
such revolutions involve the co-evolution of many
different systems, during the first decades of their
deployment there will be prevalence of important
new technologies in phases 1 and 2, whereas in
subsequent decades the technologies approaching
maturity phases (3 and 4) will predominate, until
they overlap with those of the next transition. Thus,
the windows of opportunity of each technology are
strongly marked by the broader context of the
propagation of the paradigm. This affects the
strategies of both businesses and countries.
iii) Finally, the choice between dependent or
autonomous entry is determined to a large extent
by the conditions of the particular firm. It is also
necessary to know the evolution of the power
structures, in order to clearly identify the present
and future interests of possible partners or
competitors. The weaker the firm, the more
important it is to learn to dance with powerful
“wolves” (and even to distinguish among wolves
and discover how to attract them).
Not all technologies are open to negotiation, of course.
It may also happen that confrontation will be necessary
in a zero-sum game. What must be avoided is to
negotiate mutually beneficial agreements as though
they were confrontations. It is ingenuous to think that
through import substitution or export promotion
policies governments were imposing conditions and
restrictions on transnational corporations or obliging
them to establish operations in the countries in
question. In both cases, what was being negotiated in
practice was a framework of regulations and incentives
which solved the problems of both parties
simultaneously. This indicates that, if the interests and
needs of possible allies are clearly identified each time,
the danger of aiming at the wrong target will be
avoided, and negotiations will be based on a full
awareness of the value of one’s own competitive
advantages.
9
 Schmitz and Knorringa (1999) and Schmitz and Nadvi (1999).
See also IDS Collective Efficiency Research Project (2001).
10
 Used in a similar sense by Mytelka (1994).
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Historically, processes of rapid growth and
development ?whether catching up from behind or
forging ahead to the front ranks? have been the fruit of
well-managed technological development processes
(Lall, 1992; Bell and Pavitt, 1993a; Reinert, 1994;
Freeman, 1994; Von Tunzelmann, 1995). Generally
speaking, they have been based on playing successive
positive-sum games with the most advanced actors and
on being prepared to change the game as the context
and the structures evolve.
TABLE 1
Changes in patterns of competition and power structures
as factors conditioning entry possibilities,
according to phase of technological evolution
Stylized summary
Phase in life cycle of product and its technology
1. Introduction 2. Early growth 3. Late Growth 4. Maturity
Focus: compe- Quality of product; Efficiency of production; Market scale and Lower costs
titive factors the test of the market access to market power
Competition Many new competitors Industry taking shape; Tendency to concentration; Financial power. Search
and power Unpredictable results  firms growing and giant complex structures; for profitable new
fighting for markets; oligopolies, cartels, etc. opportunities and ways
Emergence of leaders of extending the life of
 the existing ones
AUTONOMOUS ENTRY
Size of window Broad Narrow Very narrow Widening
Basis for Knowledge: capacity to Knowledge plus experience Experience, financial Comparative advantages
attempting imitate and innovate in process and market power and control of market in terms of costs
autonomous (without infringing technology (importance of Learning capacity
entry patents) on local technical brands or privileged access Capacity to copy
know how in order to to market)
create a specialized niche
Nature of Free competition to gain Aggressive competition for Absorption or exclusion of Competition with other
autonomous acceptance in the market growing, highly profitable the weakest participants low-cost producers;
entry (initiated and perhaps to establish markets Possible formation of purchase (or copying) of
by challengers) the dominant design; Possible alliances cartels mature technologies and
patents can be important know how or development
here of rejuvenatory innovations
DEPENDENT ENTRY
Size of window Narrow Very narrow Widening Very broad
Basis for Comparative or dynamic Attractive market Large market Comparative advantages
negotiating advantages; Competition as a supplier Externalities that already in terms of costs
dependent complementary assets or advantageous access exist or can be created; other Access to finance
entry to resources or markets ways of promoting gains Learning capacity
Nature of entry Alliances; negotiations As a supplier or trade As part of the structure (as a Production contracts or
on a dependent on mutual benefits of representative supplier, producer, joint ventures of mutual
basis or in sharing complementary distributor or in any other benefit (transfer of mature
alliance with capacity and/or assets capacity which serves the technologies and market
another firm (in order to strengthen power strategy and expansion access)
(usually initiated potential for competition) plans of the more powerful
by owner of the firm)
latter)
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V
Accumulated experience and future
windows of opportunity
Looking back at the recent history of the developing
world and the different strategies applied, we see that,
consciously or intuitively, successive positive-sum
games were established between the interests of the
advanced country firms and those of the developing
nations. Analysis of this experience could help to view
the future with more soundly based criteria. As always
happens with the lessons of history, however, a
distinction must be made between recurrence and
uniqueness. There are patterns of change which are
repeated in each paradigm, but each of them is
essentially unique and must be analysed in the light of
its own peculiar characteristics.
1. Inventing and reinventing development
strategies
The modern era of deliberate State intervention in the
industrialization of Third World countries took shape
clearly in the 1950s, when a growing number of mass
production industries were in phase 3, trying to expand
markets, seeking economies of scale, forming
oligopolies, and opening international marketing
outlets. Import substitution industrialization, subsidized
by the State and protected by tariff barriers, was the
positive-sum game that was established at that time.
The international corporations multiplied their markets
for final products by exporting much greater amounts
of “unassembled” parts to their subsidiaries abroad,
which in addition had higher profit margins. In the
developing countries, for their part, although those
factories only engaged in “screw-driver assembly”
activities, they and the enterprises and organizations
stimulated by their demand created a learning context
for both management and workers. Their demand for
construction services, highways, ports, transport,
electricity, water and communications stimulated the
modernization of the surrounding areas and the
development of many complementary capabilities.
In the mid-1960s, some countries began to
encounter the limits of the import substitution
industrialization model, while in the advanced countries
many products and industries were entering phase 4:
maturity and stagnation. Technology transfer and export
promotion policies emerged as the new form of relations
of mutual benefit. This process entailed the transfer of
mature technologies to public and private enterprises,
as well as the establishment of subsidiaries to produce
goods for re-export, in areas with cheap labour.
Already by the 1970s, the transnational corporations
were engaged in the process of industrial
redeployment, whereby they transferred a growing
proportion of their production activities to developing
countries, thus giving rise to a substantial flow of
exports to the advanced countries. The “miracles” of
Brazil and South Korea and the “export-processing
zones” in many countries gave the impression that a
new international economic order was arising. The
North-South Dialogue was set up to negotiate the
realization of those hopes.
At the beginning of the 1980s, however, the
situation changed once again. Many of the products
of the microelectronics revolution, which had irrupted
in the early 1970s, were reaching phase 2.
Furthermore, the Japanese had revitalized the
automobile industry and their new organizational
paradigm was radically transforming their competitors
in the United States and Europe (Altshuler and others,
1984). Most of the old industries of the advanced
countries reached the maturity stage in the midst of
stagflation; export markets began to shrink, and the
debt crisis broke out in the Third World. A new strategy
needed to be designed.
Most of Latin America, however, failed to do so,
and lived through the aptly designated “lost decade”.
In contrast, the Four Tigers in Asia took a leap forward
by capturing position after position in the rear end and
at the edges of the markets of the fast growing
revolutionary industries. They also rejuvenated mature
technologies with modern practices and joined the
networks of global firms as OEM suppliers of parts and
components. The intense learning and the emphasis on
human capital and on the active absorption of
technology, which was behind these achievements,
cannot be overstated (Amsden, 1989: Ch. 9; Bell and
Pavitt, 1993b). It is in sharp contrast with the much
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more passive “transfer of technology” practices still
common in most Latin American and African countries,
as well as in the rest of Asia, in that period.
Figure 11 shows, from the 1950s to the present,
how development strategies adapted to the opportunities
created by the approaching maturity of one paradigm
and the initial deployment of the next.
The 1990s was marked by the vigorous
development of the new telecommunications
infrastructure, by the structuring of the emerging
industries and the modernization of the existing ones.
As one new industry after another reached phase 2, the
intense competition for market positions began. Since
then, various possibilities have arisen for the enterprises
of developing countries, due to a set of new phenomena
such as: the emergence of global corporations and
markets, the struggles to impose dominant designs and
other standards, the establishment of complex networks
of collaboration at the world level, the strengthening
of the power of brand names in the market, the pursuit
of both dynamic and static advantages in the
geographical location of the various activities, the
interest in adapting products to particular market
segments, the tendency towards outsourcing, and other
related forms of behaviour. The quality and quantity of
the opportunities deriving from all this have varied as
a function of the conditions and disposition of the
different economic agents and of the countries in which
they operate.
Experimentation in the developing countries has
been very diversified, both in terms of methods and of
results: it extends from modern “maquiladoras” and
OEM contracts to the practices followed by independent
and highly competitive Asian firms and various types
of joint ventures and alliances (Hobday, 1994). There
has also been a big increase in interconnected local
clusters in specific industries (such as software
development in India), some of which have been
successful on export markets. In this period, the four
“Asian tigers” continued to progress, stimulating
production in other Southeast Asian countries and
China. Generally speaking, the countries and firms with
successful strategies have displayed a capacity to learn
to live in a globalized world.
2 3 4
FIGURE 11
Opportunities as a moving target: Development strategies which
change according to the phases of deployment of successive paradigms
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Each of the successive strategies has had
advantages and disadvantages, benefits and negative
effects. Some countries have advanced with giant
strides, while others have taken only small steps forward
or have not advanced at all; some countries kept the
ground gained, while others have fallen back. Some of
the setbacks may have been due to having clung to
policies which had ceased to be effective. It must be
admitted that the general results are discouraging. This
may lead to disenchantment or else to recognition of
the great difficulty of narrowing the gap and the need
for a better understanding of the nature of the problems
and the opportunities.
2. Confronting the next stage
Sooner or later in this new century, the conditions will
be created for the full deployment of the wealth-
generating potential of the Information Age. The 1990s
were years of experimentation in all areas: inside and
outside global firms; in countries, regions, cities and
localities; in the economy; in governments and other
institutions, and in the different levels of society.
Consequently, the “common sense” of the flexible
networks paradigm has been widely disseminated and
is becoming the normal way of seeing and doing things.
The dawn of the 21st century marks the transition
to the third phase or period of late growth of the present
paradigm.11 Many industries are also reaching phase 3
in their trajectories, so they are seeking economies of
scale and moving towards oligopolization in order to
reduce the pressures of free competition. Agreements,
mergers, takeovers and other arrangements are giving
rise to the world-level concentration of many important
industries into a few mega-enterprises or great global
alliances.12 Indeed, their growing power of
intermediation, through their control of access to clients,
could lead to a modern version of the old “trading
companies”, based now on the power of information
and telecommunications.13 These gigantic enterprises
could become immense global “umbrellas”
encompassing worldwide diversity in their field and
covering all the segments of the market ?from the most
specialized or luxury niches to the cheapest and most
standardized products or services? buying and selling
all over the planet and locating each activity where it
enjoys the greatest advantages.
For the developing world, the next stage may be a
very complex period of accommodation to the new
emerging power structures. For enterprises, localities,
regions and countries, finding out what positive-sum
games are possible with these giants could define the
nature of their next window of opportunity. Trying to
create local or regional networks, either independently
or in association with global networks, may still be
possible when there are very specific local advantages.
Countries and enterprises which have acquired
technological, organizational, marketing and bargaining
capabilities will of course be in a much better position
either to find a favourable arrangement under the global
“umbrellas” or to boldly establish themselves outside
them. Cooperation among enterprises, regions or
countries can increase the bargaining power of their
leading actors and agents, both weak and strong.
The formulation of successful strategies therefore
calls for a careful evaluation of the conditions and
accumulated capacities of the country, region, enterprise
or network in question, in order to take advantage of
the next window of opportunity (not the window which
is already closing), while at the same time recognizing,
adopting and adapting the potential and features of the
relevant paradigm. We will now look at some of the
implications of these features.
11
 For a more complete analysis of the phases in the evolution of a
paradigm and the role played by financial capital in the process,
see Pérez, 2002.
12
 See Chesnais (1988 and 1992), Bressand (1990), Klepper and
Kenneth (1994) and Castells (1997).
13
 See Bressand and Kalypso (eds.) (1989), and Kanellou (2000).
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VI
Addressing development in the
context of the present paradigm
In the case of the developing countries, it is an
illusion to believe that significant advances are possible
without equivalent efforts. There are no magic formulas
for achieving development without mastering
technology, in the simple sense of social, technical and
economic know-how incorporated in people. This fact,
which was fully recognized in the past, was lost from
sight in the very special conditions of import substitution
policies, which made it possible –for a time– for many
countries to achieve extraordinary results in terms of
growth, by investing in mature installations, equipment
and technologies without having to make intensive
learning and training efforts.
In this new paradigm, in particular, development of
the capacity to take advantage of information and know-
how for innovation is more important than ever. Perhaps
the most relevant sense of the expression “knowledge
society” (Castells, 1997; Mansell and Wehn (eds.), 1998)
is the creation of conditions for all members of society to
have access to information and make use of it.
Consequently, strengthening the individual and social
learning capabilities for wealth generation becomes a
fundamental way of enhancing development potential.
For this to take place, technology must occupy a
central and not just a peripheral place in development
policies. In practice, this means adopting a different
way of conceiving strategies and calls for a complete
reformulation of the education and training systems
as well as of science and technology policies.
In reforming education, it is essential to update
and upgrade the technical contents of programmes
and –perhaps even more importantly– to make radical
changes in the methods, objectives and instruments
of training in order to make them relevant for the
future and compatible with the new forms of
organization (Pérez, 1992 and 2000; ECLAC, 1992).
This reform must induce students to take responsibility
for their own training processes; it must place emphasis
on “learning to learn” and “learning to change”; it
must foster creative teamwork, teaching students to
formulate problems and evaluate alternative
solutions; it must find ways of providing access to
computers and the Internet; and it must create the
Rapid growth of firms, localities or countries depends
on the availability of a rich technological potential and
a suitable form of organization for taking advantage of
it. Whatever the starting point and the objective pursued,
success in the present era will probably depend on how
deeply the logic of the new paradigm is assimilated
and how creatively it is adopted and adapted at all levels
of society.
The old centralized pyramids of mass production
effectively served firms and governments, universities,
hospitals, and private and public organizations of all
types. For over twenty years, however, modern firms
–global or local– have been thoroughly restructuring
their activities, having quickly understood the
advantages of networks and of learning organizations.14
The time has now come for governments to start
experimenting in the same direction.
1. Technology at the core of development
strategies
It is a generally recognized fact that the Japanese surge
ahead to become the second largest economy in the
world (and to remain in that position in spite of its crisis)
involved exercises in technological foresight to
collectively decide the road to follow, as well as
intensive learning, training and innovative efforts (Peck
and Goto, 1981; Irvine and Martin, 1985). The advance
of the four “Asian tigers” from their initial position in
the rear also involved a large-scale educational and
learning effort (Ernst, Ganiatsos and Mytelka (eds.),
1998). Furthermore, the global enterprises which have
been successful have reformulated their structures and
practices to promote continuous learning and
improvement. Knowledge management (Nonaka, 1995;
Burton-Jones, 1999; Lamoreaux and others (eds.),
1999) is becoming a fundamental concern: enterprises
not only organize regular training courses at all levels,
but some have even created their own “universities”
(Wiggenhorn, 1990).
14
 Nonaka (1994), Senge (1990) and Lundvall (1997); see also the
website of the DRUID project (DRUID, 2001).
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necessary conditions for giving students not so much
the capacity to provide answers as the capacity to ask
questions and process information.
These skills and aptitudes are becoming basic
conditions for participating in the modern workplace,
where firms are facing a constantly evolving
environment that demands continuous improvement.
They also allow persons and groups to become
responsible for their own capacity to generate wealth,
either as employees or as entrepreneurs, and they
provide the organizational abilities needed to improve
communities and organizations, either as group
members or as leaders.
The other vital transformation concerns the
“Science and Technology System”, which was created
in most developing countries as a set of government
institutions responsible for technological development.
Experience showed that very little use was made of
these capabilities to incorporate innovations in the world
of production. As most of the industries were using
mature technologies, they had little capacity to absorb
the results of the activities of these laboratory
technologists. The consequent frustration experienced
when trying to “build a bridge” between the universities
and industry led most of the technological researchers
to become adjuncts of the scientific community and to
adopt its methods, time-scales, values and attitudes.
In the new context, it is necessary to act on two
fronts: to make substantial investments in research for
the future, and to re-connect the technological
development effort with the direct and immediate
improvement of production networks and the quality
of life.
This transition from a “supply-push” science and
technology system to an interactive network with
producers has warranted the term “National System of
Innovation (NSI)” (Freeman, 1987; Lundvall, 1988)
which has been defined by Freeman as “the network of
institutions in the public and private sectors whose
activities and interactions initiate, import, modify and
diffuse new technologies” (Freeman, 1995).
This starts out from the assumption that a national
system of innovation is a social, not a governmental
construction. It includes such elements as the
environment in which innovation is stimulated and
supported; the quality of the links between suppliers,
producers and users; the education and training system;
various public and private organizations facilitating
technical change; and laws, regulations and even ideas
and attitudes towards technology and change (Arocena,
1997).
2. Reinventing the “strong” State15
It should by now be clear that the market versus State
debate is not adequate for dealing with the concrete
problems discussed here. Both markets and State are
needed, albeit redefined and combined in a new way.
At all events, it will be gathered from the foregoing
analysis that a successful development strategy for a
lagging country will require, according to the logic of
the current paradigm (and especially in the presence of
global mega-firms), a high level of cooperation among
firms and between them and the State at its various
levels.
Although the magnitude and complexity of this
task call for a strong State, the type of all-powerful State
developed after World War II must be redefined and
reinvented, probably along similar lines to those applied
by modern global corporations.
No one could suggest that the central
management of a giant corporation is weakened by
decentralizing and giving high autonomy and
decision-making power to its product, plant or market
managers across the world. Computers and
telecommunications have made it easier to exercise
strong leadership over a vast and growing structure
made up of semi-autonomous units following
stra tegic guidelines.  Thanks to interactive
information channels, it is possible to monitor and
control extremely complex networks which have
flexible components and are highly differentiated.
Such networks could be imitated in the new
configuration of a strong public sector which is needed.
As in previous technological revolutions, once
technology helps to define the optimum configuration
of organizations, these can function effectively even
without the technology. In turn, this prepares the terrain
for the incorporation of modern technology when
required.
The central national State can exercise its
leadership by inducing the convergent actions of the
various social actors towards a commonly agreed
general direction of change. It can play a crucial role
as intermediary between the growing global or supra-
regional instances and the increasingly autonomous
regional, local and even parish or community levels.
A process of “diffusion of power” is also taking
place (Strange, 1996). Networks of private interests,
15
 See Reinert (1999), Wade (1990) and Osborne and Gaebler
(1994).
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the various components of civil society, global firms,
the media, organized interest groups, non-governmental
organizations (NGOs) and other entities are increasing
the diversity of development agents and their
interconnections, at both the national and global levels.
The State must be capable of acting as a broker within
the country and between the different supra-national
and subnational levels, in order to promote and negotiate
equitable opportunities for all. Taking on the role of
consensus builder among the different actors, the State
may be able to exercise more effective authority, as the
foundation of real power to influence the course of
events.
3. Think global, act local
The new seat of the proactive developmental state is,
in our view, the local government. The old “central
plan” idea of promoting a set of national industries to
generate the wealth to fund social advance needs to be
reconsidered. Obviously, in each country a set of
important and competitive activities must develop,
strongly connected to world markets and keeping up
with the technological frontier, propelling growth and
producing the necessary foreign exchange. But that is
not enough. The time and the conditions have come to
abandon the illusion of a “trickle down effect” and move
towards the direct involvement of the whole population
in wealth creating activities.
The characteristics of the present paradigm suggest
that there will be a more integrated form of development
in which the big, competitive industries trading on the
world market will be complemented with the
differentiated development of each part of the territory.
This is possible by taking advantage of the new
flexibility in terms of variety of products and
competitive scales of production, of the power to
increase the quality and efficiency of all sectors and
activities (including artisan type activities) and –most
important– the fact that all human beings can be given
access to continuous learning processes in order to
constantly improve their capabilities, their work and
their environment.
Many examples can be ci ted of  local
governments identifying the production potential
of their communities, promoting consensus and
securing the participation of local and foreign firms,
banks, the education system and other local and
external agents in order to propel development
projects (Tendler, 1997; Gabor, 1991; The Illinois
Coalition, 1999). There are also local networks of
small and medium-sized firms collaborating in
business and technological development to cover
exports jointly (Nadvi and Schmitz (eds.), 1999).
Authors who have studied the interaction that takes
place within these clusters, or agglomerations of
firms with related activities in the same locality,
have suggested using the expression “local systems
of innovation” (Cassiolato and Lastres (eds.), 1999),
although in our view it would be more appropriate
to cal l  them “terr i tor ial  networks of
innovativeness”.
A highly successful experience has also been
accumulated by specialized banks giving “micro-
credits” to help men and women in urban and rural
areas to set up income generating activities (Otero
and Rhyne (eds.), 1994; Chaves and González,
1996). This is gradually breaking the myth that
providing jobs is the only way to improve the
quality of life of whole populations and favouring
the idea of promoting multiple forms of individual
or collective entrepreneurship. Addressing the
plight of rural communities will also require
abandoning the old pro-urban and pro-
manufacturing biases (Fieldhouse, 1986, p. 152;
Mytelka, 1989) and empowering local governments
with the resources and the technical support to
directly tackle the issue of improving the local
levels of living. These “localized” activities can
often connect as suppliers in the networks of global
corporations or become part of the support network
of the big exporting activities of the country.
4. Modernity and values
Naturally, the decisions involved are of a political
nature, but the real options are not always clear.
Historically, in each transition from one paradigm to
another the current definitions of left and right become
blurred. Each of the groups undergoes an internal
division between those who cling to old ways of
achieving their goals and those that embrace the
potential of the new paradigm and gear it to their ends
(figure 12).
In the previous transition, between the two world
wars, the social and homogenizing nature of the new
mass production paradigm was so strong that even
Nazism called itself “National Socialism”. Likewise,
the role played by the centralized State was so
important that after World War II even the most liberal
nations adopted the model of State intervention in the
economy in its entirety, following the ideas of Keynes,
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which had met with so much resistance in the 1920s
and 1930s. Unfortunately for those who are convinced
of the need for social solidarity, however,
neoliberalism is the only coherent programme that has
adopted the present paradigm. Although there are
thousands of isolated experiments in forward-looking
practices such as participatory democracy and local
consensus-building, no coherent experience or
proposal has yet been put forward that could serve as
a modern alternative to the pure market. Without it, in
our view, there may be world growth, but there is
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